The "friendship paradox" (Feld 1991 ) is the structural implication of networks that, on average, peoples' friends have strictly more friends than the average person in a network. In particular, the number of people who observe a given person is proportional to the number of connections that the person has. This can distort perceptions of norms and behavior if more popular people in a society behave differently from less popular people. As I show here there are two things that drive people with more friends to behave differently from people with fewer friends. The first is that in any setting with strategic complementarities, people with more friends are exposed to greater interaction and influence. The second is that people who benefit more from a given activity will tend to form more relationships as they benefit more from the complementarities. These two effects lead people with more friends to choose more extreme actions, which in turn feeds back via the the friendship paradox to increase overall perceptions of behavior and then via complementarities to amplify average behavior. These theoretical results are consistent with the multitude of studies finding that students (from middle school through university) consistently overestimate peer consumption of alcohol, cigarettes, and drugs. This in turn amplifies students' own behaviors, and can help explain problems with adolescent abuse of drugs and alcohol, as well as other behaviors. I also discuss how these results change in cases of strategic substitutes, where individuals overestimate free-riding by peers. JEL Classification Codes: D85, D13, L14, O12, Z13
Introduction
Our social norms are governed by our perceptions of others. Those perceptions are heavily determined by those around us. As our friends are not a random selection from the population -even on average -we are biased in the samples with whom we interact. This in turn can systematically affect our actions and help explain a variety of distortions in peoples' beliefs and actions, ranging from the delinquency behavior of adolescents to our propensity to donate to charities.
The distortion stems in part from the "friendship paradox" that was pointed out by the sociologist Scott Feld in 1991. Feld observed that most peoples' friends have more friends on average, than people do on average. That is, the average number of friends that a typical person's friend has is higher than the average number of friends that people have in the population. This follows from the fact that the number of people who are friends with a given individual is proportional to the number of connections that the individual has. A person with many friends is observed by many more people than someone who has very few friends, and so samples of friends end up weighting people not by their proportions in the population but instead in proportion to their popularity.
The extent of the friendship paradox varies by setting, but is present in every network in which there is at least one friendship involving people with different degrees (see Lemma 1 below). In a rural Indian village, as we will see below, friends have on average more than 40 percent more friends than the average villager. The friendship paradox can be greatly magnified by social media. For example, a study of Twitter behavior by Hodas, Kooti, and Lerman (2013) found that more than 98 percent of users had fewer followers than the people whom they followed: typically a user's "friends" had ten times as many followers, or more, than the user. Given the increased use of social media, especially by adolescents, the potential for biased perceptions in favor of a tiny proportion of the most popular users becomes overwhelming. Given that students' decisions of whether to engage in potentially risky behaviors, or how much they should study, etc., may be based on what they perceive others to be doing, students risk biasing their behaviors towards that of students who have the most connections. This is not just true of students, but anyone involved in choosing behaviors that are influenced by their perceptions of others' behaviors.
The impact of the friendship paradox is evident in a series of studies finding that students tend to over-estimate the frequency with which their peers smoke and consume alcohol and drugs, and often by substantial margins. For instance, a study covering one hundred U.S. college campuses by Perkins, Meilman, Leichliter, Cashin, and Presley (1999) found that students systematically over-estimate consumption of eleven different substances, including cigarettes, alcohol, marijuana, and a variety of other drugs. A further study by Perkins focusing on alcohol consumption compared students self-reported drinking behavior -how many drinks they had the last time they partied or socialized -to their perceptions of how many the typical student at their school the last time she or he partied or socialized. The median student (out of the more than 72000 students on the 130 colleges in the study conducted from 2000 to 2003) answered 4 drinks and a quarter of the students answered 5 drinks or more. However, even given how high these overall average numbers are, more than 70 percent of the students over-estimated the alcohol consumption of the typical student at their own school (see Table 2 in Perkins and Haines (2005) ). To explain such misperceptions, we don't have to dig deeply into the psychology of the students. When students are attending parties or social events, they are interacting disproportionately with the people who attend the most parties -so students' perceptions of alcohol consumption ends up over-representing the people who attend more parties and under-representing those who attend infrequently.
This bias in observation due to the friendship paradox would not have any impact unless those who have more connections end up behaving differently from those with fewer connections. In order for the friendship paradox to matter, it has to be that more popular students are more likely to smoke or consume alcohol in order to systematically bias students' estimates upwards. Indeed, Valente, Unger, and Johnson (2005) , in a study of middle school students, found that each additional friendship accounted for a 5 percent increase in the probability that a student smoked. Tucker, Miles, D', Zhou, Green, and Shih (2013) found similar numbers for alcohol, finding that being named as a friend by five additional others accounted for a 30 percent increase in the likelihood that a middle school student would try alcohol.
The point of this paper is to explore the impact of the friendship paradox on behavior and explain why we should expect more connected individuals to take different actions from less connected agents, and then how this feeds back to affect overall behavior. The intuition is easy to understand, but it is still very important to explore given its wide-ranging implications.
There are two basic forces at work. One is that people who have the most connections are most exposed to interactions with others, and thus given the interactions with others in any setting of strategic complements (or substitutes), their behaviors are most heavily influenced and most extreme. The second is that if people differ in their tastes for a given activity, then it is the people who benefit most from that activity who choose to have the most connections. So, if we endogenize the network, individuals with the highest marginal payoff from a given activity choose to have the highest degree. This further amplifies the effect, increasing the disparity of actions between high-degree and low-degree individuals. Combined, these forces lead people's most popular friends to exhibit more extreme behaviors, and via feedback through the complementarities to bias the overall behavior in the society. For instance, returning to the example above, since consuming alcohol by teenagers is in part (or largely) a social activity, the people who spend more time socializing with others would have more reason to consume alcohol at an early age, and would also tend be those who have a greater base proclivity to consume alcohol at an early age. So, students who are more often seen as friends by others being more likely to consume alcohol leads to biased samples and biased perceptions, consistent with the data, and feeds back to produce high levels of activity overall.
Before describing the formal model, let me begin with some background on the friendship paradox and a simple illustration of how it can bias behaviors in the context of an example.
The Friendship Paradox
Let us begin with a quick look at the data set from Coleman (1961) that was originally cited by Feld (1991) . A portion of Coleman's data is pictured in Figure 1 . 1 There are fourteen girls pictured. For nine of the girls, their friends have on average more friends than they do. Two girls have the same number of friends as their friends do on average, while only three of the girls are more popular than their friends on average. On average the girls have 2.6 friends, while on average their friends have 3.2 friends. Coleman's (1961) study of high school friendships. Nodes are girls and links are mutual friendships. The first number listed for each girl is how many friends the girl has and the second number is the average number of friends that the girl's friends have. For instance, the girl in the lower left-hand corner has 2 friends, and those friends have 2 and 5 friends, for an average of 3.5. 9 out of 14 of the girls are less popular than their friends, 3 are more popular than their friends, and 2 are equal in popularity to their friends. The average number of friends that the girls have is 2.6, while the average number of friends that their friends have is 3.2.
To see the friendship paradox in more detail and in a larger network, let us examine the network of connections between households in a rural Indian village Figure 2 . The full distribution of degrees and the distribution of degrees of neighbors is given in Figure 3 , and we see that friends' degrees are more than forty percent larger than the average degree in the society.
The friendship paradox is easy to understand. The most popular people appear on many other peoples' friendship lists, while the people with very few friends appear on relatively few peoples' lists. The following lemma is a variation of Theorem 1 in Just, Callender, and A finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents, with generic indices i, j, are members of an undirected 2 network g ∈ {0, 1} n×n , so that g is symmetric and has 0's on the diagonals. Agent i ∈ N has d i (g) = j g ij links in the network.
Lemma 1 [The Friendship Paradox -General Networks] For any network, the average degree of neighbors at least as high as the average degree and the inequality is strict if and only if at least two linked agents have different degrees.
That is,
, with strict inequality if (and only if ) at least two linked agents have different degrees.
The proof is straightforward and for completeness appears in the appendix. A stronger characterization of the magnitude of the friendship paradox appears in Lemma 2 below, as it can be derived once we give more structure to the set of networks considered.
In a mathematical sense, the paradox is not very deep -but of course paradoxes rarely are. Nonetheless, it has wide-ranging and important implications, as we shall see.
An Example of the Impact of the Friendship Paradox
To see these implications most starkly, let us consider a simple example.
A society of agents are influenced by their friends.
3 The agents choose one of two actions, either solid and plaid. They each have a slight preference for solid or plaid and in the first period they follow those preferences. However, agents are conformists and prefer to mach the majority of others, and only follow their own preference if there were equal numbers of others in each style. They start with the choices in the upper left-hand figure, with only four people preferring solid and eight preferring plaid. If they could all see the whole group and best replied to that, then they would all choose plaid in the next period. However, instead agents actually see and react to their neighbors in the network. It turns out that the four most popular agents prefer solid. The remaining figures show what happens each following period under a best-reply dynamic. The popular agents all see each other and some others, but a majority of whom they see are solid and so they stay with solid. Some other agents react to the popular agents and switch to solid, which eventually cascades.
We see the friendship paradox's role in this by examining Figure 6 , which shows how agents' perceptions differ from the overall population. The most popular agents are overrepresented in peoples' friendships and so three quarters of the agents perceive that solids are in the majority even though two thirds of the agents prefer plaid.
2 The paradox extends to directed networks when one considers the average in-degree of friends. 3 To see similar examples illustrating biased estimation of opinions, see Lerman, Yan, , and Wu (2015) . On can also find examples in popular blogs (e.g., see Kevin Schaul's Washington Post blog from Oct. 9, 2015 "A quick puzzle to tell whether you know what people are thinking"). The effect in this example has been documented quite clearly in a set of experiments by Kearns, Judd, Tan, and Wortman (2009) . The researchers set up a laboratory version of a committee or political party having to agree on a candidate. They built groups of 36 subjects who had to coordinate on a candidate. Like our solid-plaid example above, the subjects were connected in a network. They were at computer screens and could each toggle back and forth between red or blue at any instant. They could also see which color their friends in the network were supporting at any time. But they could not see the whole network. Their objective was to reach a consensus within 60 seconds. If all 36 subjects ever managed to reach the same color at some instant, then the experiment ended with that being the consensus. If the subjects came to a consensus, unanimously supporting the same candidate, then they won a monetary payment. If they did not reach a consensus then they did not receive the payment. Again, similar to our solid-plaid example, the subjects had preferences over the candidates. Some subjects received a higher monetary payment if the red candidate was the consensus and others got paid more if the blue candidate was the consensus. For instance, in some treatments, a red-supporting subject got paid fifty cents if the group unanimously supported the blue candidate and a dollar fifty if the group unanimously supported the red candidate, and nothing if the group failed to reach unanimity. Thus, subjects preferred to have a consensus on their preferred candidate, but would rather reach a consensus on the other candidate than to fail to reach a consensus.
There were twenty seven runs of the experiment in which the network was set up in a manner similar to our solid-plaid example: only a small minority of the subjects were supporters of one color and vast majority of subjects were supporters of the other color.
The key was that the small minority of subjects preferring red were the 'popular' nodeshaving many more friends in the network.
A consensus was reached in 24 out of the 27 iterations of the experiment. More importantly, every one of the successful groups reached a consensus that was the minority group of 'popular' subjects' preferred candidate, even though the majority preferred the other candidate. So, consistently, even when only six subjects preferred one color, and thirty preferred the other, the group still settled on the preferred color of the small group of the most popular subjects. The researchers also ran some other variations of the experiment in which the networks were instead structured to be more evenly balanced with more equal numbers of supporters of red and blue, and in which the subjects had similar numbers of connectionsso without a set of popular students. In those versions of the experiment the coordination was significantly less likely to occur: only 11 out of 27 groups managed to coordinate when the number of connections was fairly evenly balanced among subjects.
The Contribution of the Current Paper
The experiments and example described above show how the friendship paradox can matter.
5
However, the example and experiment have starting behavior that is correlated with degree. What is missing is an understanding of why higher degree individuals' actions should exhibit any systematic pattern that differs from others, and how this feeds back to the society. If we began with higher degree individuals split evenly between solid and plaid in our example, or blue and red in the experiments, there would have been no predictable bias in the outcome.
The contribution of this paper is to show why the friendship paradox matters by embedding it in settings in which agents' behaviors are influenced by their friends and the overall level of activity of their friends. Thus, higher degree individuals are exposed to more activity and are more affected, leading them to take systematically more extreme actions, which then feeds back to increase overall activity in the network. Also, agents who benefit most from the activity choose to have more interactions, further increasing their own behavior and that of others. These two effects lead to systematic and predictable overall distortions in the equilibria of such games played on networks. This predictable pattern allows me to document the welfare implications of the friendship paradox.
The results I present are as follows. The main results demonstrate the two forces described above. I start with the setting of a linear-quadratic game of strategic complements in which a closed-form solution for behavior is obtainable. There I show how the fact that agents' preferences over colors did not bias the results.
5 This fact has not been lost on marketers as it is the basis for promotions such as giving out two free samples to a potential consumer and asking them to give the extra to a friend -an easy way for a company to get samples into the hands of more popular people who might influence others. It also is an important driver of identifying most-at-risk individuals, for instance using snowball sampling to identify people most at risk for HIV, and has been shown to affect peoples' susceptibility to flu (Christakis and Fowler, 2010) . Taking advantage of the visibility of friends can also help in fostering adoption of new programs (e.g., Kim et al. (2015) ).
actions are ordered by their degree biases overall activity upwards in a game on a network compared to a benchmark society with uniform-at-random matching. Next, I endogenize the network, showing that people with greater preference for an activity choose to have higher degree, and that this leads to a further amplification of the overall activity in the society. After studying the linear-quadratic setting, I use results on monotone comparative statics to show that these two effects extend to a general class of supermodular games played on networks. I also provide results on comparative statics and welfare orderings, showing how the friendship paradox improves overall welfare in settings with positive externalities and is harmful in settings with negative externalities. Finally, I examine how the results change when moving to a setting of strategic substitutes. There, higher degree agents (on a fixed network) choose lower actions when they are exposed to a higher total action by their friends. This leads agents in a network to perceive lower levels of behavior by their neighbors, compared to a random matching, as the highest degree individuals take the lowest actions. Given the substitute condition, agents respond to lower perceived actions by their neighbors by increasing their own actions. Thus, when accounting for the behavior as a function of degree and its feedback, we find that activity on a network ends up being higher in the network setting than in a benchmark with uniform-at-random matching. However, once we endogenize the network, the result in the case of strategic substitutes becomes ambiguous, as then agents with greater preference for the activity choose higher degree, but this offsets the proclivity of higher degree agents to free-ride more, leading to competing effects. Thus, while the ordering in the context of endogenous networks with strategic complements is clear and distorts behavior of all agents upwards, in the case of strategic substitutes the overall effect is ambiguous.
A Model and the Friendship Paradox 2.1 Agents and Random Networks
A finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents, with generic indices i, j, are members of a random network. We examine interactions at an interim stage, when each agent knows his or her degree but not the full structure of the network. In particular, agents do not know how many friends each of their friends has (or will have).
Given some i, let P i (d) be the degree distribution of each of i's neighbors under a random network formation model, and suppose that this marginal distribution is the same for each of i's neighbors. This does not require any independence between degrees, it is just a condition on the marginal distribution. Let E i [·] denote the expectation and V ar i [·] be the variance associated with P i . This allows for general degree distributions, including scale-free distributions, Poisson distributions, and hybrids.
The key fact that is used below is that the probability that some given link of i connects to an agent who has degree d is given by
Let me emphasize the perspective here. A network has formed, or will form, and we examine a particular node i who knows its degree d i and the distribution from which the degrees of its neighbors are drawn but not their actual degrees. The degrees of the potential neighbors are described by P i . If we look at any one of i's links and ask what the distribution of degrees of the neighbor on that link is, then it is described by P i (d).
8 This follows directly since people with higher degrees must be friends more frequently -in proportion to their degree. For instance, if half of the population has degree 2 and half has degree 1, then two thirds of the friends in the network must be of degree 2 as they are twice as likely to be linked to as the degree 1 people.
The Friendship Paradox
Let E i denote expectations with respect to P i . From (1) it follows that the expected degree of i's neighbors (the expectation of d under
This leads to the following lemma, which is a more explicit statement of the friendship paradox in the context of a random network model.
The expected degree of a neighbor of any agent i is
.
In an extreme case, in which all nodes are perfectly positively assortatively matched, then V ar i [d] = 0 and the expected degree of a node's neighbor is simply the same as its degree. However, generally there is some variation in degree across neighbors and so the paradox implies that the average degree will be strictly less than the average neighbors' degree.
In particular, if the expectations, E i are similar across agents and we can drop the subscript, and the network is not regular so that the variance is positive, then we get an immediate corollary that
Moreover, agents whose degrees no higher than average, or in fact are even slightly above average, have strictly lower degrees than the expected degrees of their neighbors. It is only agents whose degrees are substantially above the average (by at least
) who have degrees as high as their neighbors' expected degrees.
A Linear-Quadratic Game
Let us now analyze the friendship paradox in the context of a setting with strategic complementarities.
Before turning to the general case, let us explore how the friendship paradox plays out in a linear quadratic game. This is a variation on the games studied by Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006); Bramoullé and Kranton (2014) ; Belhaj, Bramoulle, and Deroan (2014); de Marti and Zenou (2015) .
9 The advantage of the linear-quadratic formulation is that it admits a closed-form solution and cleanly illustrates the intuition behind the general results.
Agent i has a type θ i ∈ Θ, where Θ is a compact subset of IR + . Types have a support that includes positive values, and may be correlated with degrees (as we will derive in the endogenous network case below). So, now we extend P i to let it denote the probability distribution that i perceives jointly over the types and degrees of her potential neighbors; and so when using P i in the previous section we were considering its marginal just on degrees.
Agent i chooses an action x i ∈ IR + and gets utility described by
where N i are i's neighbors in the network. The scalar a > 0 captures the level of complementarity of an agent's action with his or her friends' actions, c > 0 scales the cost of taking the action, and φ ∈ IR is a parameter that captures the extent of global externalities -either positive or negative. For instance, if x i is a level of criminal activity, then φ would be negative, while if x i is a level of knowledge acquisition or human capital investment then φ would be positive. Agents choose their actions simultaneously, before knowing the actions or degrees of their neighbors, and so maximize
I consider the Bayesian equilibria of this game.
9 For an overview, see Jackson and Zenou (2014) .
Equilibrium
To solve for the equilibrium in closed form, consider the case in which all agents face the same degree distribution over their neighbors' types and degrees; so P i is the same for all i. Agents may still differ with regards to their own realized type and degree, but their expectations over the rest of the population are similar.
, then there is a unique Bayesian equilibrium to the game. It is symmetric and the associated equilibrium actions are:
In what follows, let us maintain the assumption that c > a E [d]. 
The Benchmark of a Playing with the Population
To understand the impact of the friendship paradox on behavior let us compare the equilibrium behavior in a network to the equilibrium behavior in a benchmark in which, instead of being in a network, agents are just randomly matched with the population for each of their interactions. 11 Denote the equilibrium in this case by x bench . This is the same as the equilibrium in (4) except that expectations are taken over the whole population with even weighting, E, rather than conditional expected degrees of neighbors by the fact that they are in a network ( E). That is,
This benchmark still allows people to have different numbers of interactions, but those interactions are with other individuals chosen uniformly at random from the population (independently of his or her degree), rather than within a network.
The Friendship Paradox and Increased Social Norms of Behavior
First, let us consider cases in which θ j and d j are uncorrelated so that the expectation of a neighbor's θ j is simply a random draw from the populations' distribution of θ's:
This allows us to separate the two effects of the degree of the agent and their preference types. In Section 3.5 we endogenize the networks in which case these become correlated. It follows from (4) that the equilibrium behavior of agents in a network is given by
Thus, the 'f p' introduces the 'friendship paradox' to the equilibrium relative to the benchmark case.
The actions in of every type of agent are strictly higher in the case with network matching than in the benchmark, as summarized in the following proposition. Consider a random network model, (a, c, φ, P ), that has a degree distribution that has a positive variance and for which E[
Then,
Proposition 1 states that equilibrium actions of all types of agents are strictly higher when they are interacting in a network and exposed to the friendship paradox, as compared to being randomly matched to the population without weighting by degree. It also states that expected neighbors' actions are even higher than the population average under the network equilibrium. This last observation is really what drives the result: neighbors in a network have higher expected degree than the population average and so are expected to take higher actions given the complementarities. Higher neighbors' actions feed back via the complementarities and raise the overall equilibrium behaviors in the network compared to the population-matching benchmark.
To get an impression of how the magnitude of the network effect varies with parameters, I have plotted the ratio of x f p /x bench evaluated at the average degree and type in Figure 7 . Utility comparisons are even more extreme as actions enter quadratically -so these curves would be squared.
Welfare Implications
The ranking of equilibrium actions has strong welfare implications: we can Pareto rank the two different scenarios, depending on the nature of the global externalities.
Let U f p (θ i , d i ) denote the expected utility of an agent of type θ i , d i under the equilibrium associated with the random network (so (3) evaluated with respect to (4)), and U bench (θ i , d i ) be the corresponding expected utility (3) under the benchmark expectations (of population matching) and the corresponding benchmark equilibrium actions.
Proposition 2 [Strict Pareto Rankings]
Consider a random network model (a, c, φ, P ), that has a degree distribution that has a positive variance and for which E[ (there exists φ < 0 such that if φ ≥ φ), then the utility of every agent is higher in the network setting than in the population-matching benchmark:
for all θ i and d i . If externalities are negative enough (there exists φ ≤ φ < 0 such that if φ ≤ φ), then the inequality is reversed:
The intuition behind the proposition is as follows. There are two forms of externalities: local ones which are positive and come through the complementarities of the actions of the agents, and global ones which could be positive or negative. In the case where both forms of externalities are positive, then having higher actions by other agents strictly increases an agent's payoff from any given level of action, and thus from the best response too. In that case, the actions of neighbors in the network setting are strictly higher than in the benchmark and so each agent of any type gets a higher utility from any possible action that she takes, and thus also when comparing best responses. The same is true if the global externalities are not too negative, as then every agent still sees a bigger positive effect from local neighbors than negative effect overall. Once, the global externality is negative enough, agents' utilities are hurt so much by others' increased actions, that even the benefits that they see from the local externality cannot offset the loss, and in that case they prefer to have lower actions of all agents and so prefer the benchmark setting to the network setting.
In the region of medium-sized negative externalities, between φ and φ, some types of agents prefer to be in the network equilibrium and others prefer the population-matching benchmark. In that middle range, people with higher types and degrees benefit enough from the feedback due to the friendship paradox to overcome the negative externalities and prefer the network setting, while people with lower types and degrees do not and prefer the benchmark setting.
Generally, neither setting has fully Pareto efficient actions, since agents are only maximizing their own utilities and not taking into account the externalities that their actions have on others. Nonetheless, this shows that the friendship paradox has strong welfare implications compared to what would happen without networked interactions. In cases such as investing in education or human capital (e.g., studying), which have positive externalities, the fact that people may base their choices off of popular individuals who have more incentives to invest in human capital is welfare-enhancing. In contrast, in cases such as delinquent behaviors among teens which have substantial negative externalities, the friendship paradox decreases welfare.
Beyond the comparison of the network equilibrium to the population matching benchmark, we can also do some comparative statics on the equilibrium as we change c, a, P . Let x f p a,c,P , U f p a,c,P denote the dependence of the equilibrium actions and utilities on the parameters of the setting.
Proposition 3 [Comparative Statics]
Compare two settings (a, c, P, φ) and (a , c , P , φ). 12 An increase in local complementarities, a decrease in the cost of action, a first order stochastic dominance increase in the distribution of neighbors' degrees, or a mean-preserving spread in the degree distribution, all increase equilibrium actions of every type and the equilibrium utility of every type of agent. That is, if a ≥ a , c ≤ c and either P ≥ F OSD P or P is a mean-preserving spread of P , 
with the reverse inequality if φ is negative enough.
The comparative statics are intuitive. Increasing the interaction factor, decreasing the cost of actions, and increasing the spread of degrees in the society, all increase the levels of activity by agents and the feedback effects, as well as the amplification due to the friendship paradox.
12 Changes in φ do not impact actions, only welfare. 13 P ≥ F OSD P indicates first-order stochastic dominance. Note that this condition applies to the distribution of neighbors' degrees, and it would not follow from stochastic dominance of P over P (see footnote 19 in Galeotti et al. (2010) ). In contrast, the mean-preserving spread is directly on the underlying degree distributions.
Endogenous Interactions and Further Amplifications of Behavior
We have seen so far that complementarities lead agents with higher degrees to take higher actions, which feed back to lead to further increase the actions of all agents given that higher degree individuals have a disproportionate impact on others' behaviors. This is one effect of the network and friendship paradox on behavior. I now outline a second effect that amplifies this first effect. People with higher tastes for the action -agents with higher θ i 's -benefit more from the interactions with others, and thus prefer to have a higher degree. Thus, when we model network formation we see a positive correlation between θ i and d i . For instance, people who get more enjoyment from some interactive behavior (especially in a social context) will prefer to interact more. This selection effect further increases the behavior of agents with high degrees, as they benefit not only from the increased complementarity that accompanies their high degrees, but they also tend to have higher base propensities for high behavior to begin with. This leads to a amplification of the feedback and behaviors throughout the population.
To see how this works, I now endogenize the network and derive the relationship between θ i and d i rather than assuming that they are independent.
Consider a game in which agents choose d i in the first stage (as a function of their θ i 's), and then choose x i in the second stage. Forming relationships is costly, and in order to obtain a closed-form solution, consider a quadratic cost function of the form C(
Agents maximize their expected utility, anticipating equilibrium choices of the other agents. The first-period (choice of degree) maximization problem is thus:
Let d end (θ i ) be the (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium degree of an agent of type θ i anticipating that agents will play the Bayesian equilibrium in the second period. Then let x end (θ i , d * (θ i )) be the resulting equilibrium actions in the second period in the overall endogenousnetwork equilibrium. As there can be multiple equilibria in the degree choice game, let us examine the maximal one (the equilibria form a lattice).
Proposition 4 [Endogenous Network Amplifications]
Let P (d) be the endogenous equilibrium distribution and suppose that it involves at least two degrees and that k is large enough.
15 Then there exists an equilibrium in which each 14 Here the equilibrium is not unique since there is always an equilibrium in which all agents choose no interactions anticipating that no other agents will enter either. Conditions are needed to ensure that the maximal equilibrium is finite, and details are provided in the appendix.
15 k has to be large enough to ensure that there is a well-defined maximal equilibrium and that best responses do not spiral off to infinity. A sufficient condition is that k > a 2 E x end (θ j , d
end j (θ j )) 2 /c, with the expressions appearing in the appendix.
agent chooses a degree which is a nondecreasing function of the agent's type. Moreover, for all θ i :
Proposition 4 clearly delineates the two effects we have been discussing. First, the bias of having higher degree people be neighbors more often leads them to have more influence, and their natural tendency to prefer higher actions given their higher rate of interaction leads to higher behaviors by agents of all types. Second, higher-type agents benefit more from having higher degrees leading to a positive correlation between degree and type, further increasing high-degree agents' actions and further increasing the behaviors of all agents.
Note that the comparison holds even though we are making the comparison at the endogenous degree distribution (d end (θ i ) appears in all three action calculations), which gives the highest possible values for x f p and x bench . Thus, even accounting for the endogenous high degree distributions, the extra effect is coming from the correlation of degree and types that is accounted for in
. Given these rankings of actions for each type and degree, it follows directly that the average rankings follow the same rule. Then there is a direct extension of the welfare result, Proposition 2, to this case too: with externalities that are positive or not too negative, all types of agents prefer the endogenous equilibrium to the friendship paradox equilibrium without correlation between types and degrees, to the benchmark case of playing with population averages; while with very negative externalities the ranking is exactly reversed.
Proposition 5 [Strict Pareto Rankings with Endogenous Networks]
Consider a random network model (a, c, φ), and let P (d) be the endogenous equilibrium distribution and suppose that it involves at least two degrees and that k is large enough for well-defined equilibria (k > a 2 E x end (θ j , d j (θ j )) 2 /c ). If externalities are positive or not too negative (there exists φ < 0 such that if φ ≥ φ), then
for all θ i . If externalities are negative enough (there exists φ < φ < 0 such that if φ ≤ φ), then the inequality is reversed.
General Games with Complementarities
I now show that the results above extend directly to general games on networks with strategic complements.
16 Omitted definitions here are standard from the literature on supermodular games (e.g., see Milgrom and Shannon (1994) ; Van Zandt and Vives (2007) ).
Each agent i chooses a strategy from a set X i , which is a compact metric lattice with associated partial order ≥ i . For each i, let θ i lie in a partially ordered set Θ. The utility of agent i with degree d i of type θ i when other agents play actions x −i is given by
where N i is the realized set of neighbors of i.
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Following Van Zandt and Vives (2007), let us say that u i has a smooth dimension if X i = X i1 × X i2 in which X i1 is a compact interval of IR and X i2 is a complete lattice, u i is continuously differentiable in x i1 , and ∂u i /∂x i1 is strictly increasing in θ i , d i .
Agents choose actions as a function of their types θ i , d i . Let there be some given measure on types θ in the population denoted µ. Let agents view their neighbors' degrees as independent across neighbors and independent of the types. Given are distributions on the degrees of agents other than i in the population P i , and associated P i defined by (1), which could be functions of (
Bayesian equilibrium strategies corresponding to beliefs on neighbors' types defined by µ × P i and µ × P i , respectively.
Proposition 6 [Network Distortions on Behavior: General Games with Strategic Complements]
Consider a game for which u i is continuous, bounded, and supermodular in x i , and satisfies increasing differences in (x i ; (x j ) j∈N i , θ i , d i ), for each i. Let P i have weight on at least two degrees and P i and P i be monotone functions of θ i , d i .
18 Then maximal Bayesian equilibria, x f p i and x bench i exist and are nondecreasing in θ i , d i . Moreover,
If for each i, u i has a smooth dimension on which
Proposition 4 extends to the general case as well, presuming that u i satisfies increasing differences in (x i , d i ; (x j ) j∈N i , θ i ), with appropriate conditions to ensure that there are nontrivial degree distributions in equilibrium.
We also have an immediate corollary that if externalities are positive (so that u i is increasing in (x j ) j∈N i ), the the expected utility of the equilibria are ordered in the same way as the actions, while if externalities are negative (u i is decreasing in (x j ) j∈N i ) then the welfare ordering is the reverse of the actions.
Public Goods and Strategic Substitutes
The results above concern games of strategic complements. It is a case of particular interest since many interactions of interest fall into this category. Nonetheless, games with strategic substitutes also apply to many settings, such as those in which agents share tasks or contribute to local public goods. Let me briefly discuss how the results change in the case of substitutes.
With strategic substitutes the interaction of incentives between agents is reversed compared that under strategic complements. In a game of local strategic substitutes, i's utility is again described by a function of the form
in which we maintain the same assumptions as in the case of complementarities before, except that we reverse the direction of how x j∈N i and d i affect changes in utility with regards to changes in x i . In particular, in this case u i satisfies increasing differences in (
19 So, agents prefer to take lower actions if they have more neighbors and/or those neighbors take higher actions. It is still possible that agents have utility that increases in x j∈N i and d i , but the incentives to choose a higher x i decreases as an agent sees more activity by others in their neighborhood. This applies to standard local public goods games.
In such a setting, using similar arguments to those behind the results above, with a sign reversal, it follows that x * (θ i , d i ) is nondecreasing in θ i and nonincreasing in d i . This then also provides implications for the friendship paradox. When matched with higher degree neighbors (presuming independence between θs and ds), one expects less activity from those neighbors than when matched with lower degree neighbors. Thus, the network setting leads agents to expect less action by their neighbors than in the benchmark population matching setting, and so this ultimately leads agents to increase their own actions in response.
To see how this works in more detail, let us consider a canonical example. The example is that of a best-shot public goods game (e.g., see Galeotti et al. (2010) ).
In this setting, each agent chooses an action x i ∈ {0, 1} -whether to provide a local public good. Providing the good costs c > 0. The agent's payoff is then the max of the actions in his or her neighborhood, including her own action. In particular, the payoff is
where I is the indicator function. This applies to settings in which if one agent invests in the public good then all of his friends can share in the value of the good. Examples include completing a task, or buying a book that can be lent to friends, or acquiring information that can be shared with the friends (but for simplicity does not transfer multiple hops). Each agent would prefer that a neighbor provide the good, but would rather provide the good if no neighbor does. Let π i denote the perceived probability that a neighbor of a given agent i provides the public good. An agent prefers providing the public good if
Thus, there is a threshold t i (d i ) > 0 for which the agent's best response is to provide the public good (x i = 1) if θ i > t i (d i ) and not to provide the public good (
When the distribution of neighbors' degrees and types is the same across agents, the probability that a random neighbor will provide the public good, denoted by π, is then
In equilibrium this must solve
Given that the right hand side is decreasing in π and is positive when π = 0 (presuming that c lies in the support of θ), this has a unique solution.
Next, note that first order stochastic dominance shifts in P (d) lead the right hand side to decrease for every value of π and so the equilibrium value of π must decrease.
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This in turn, leads to a lower value of t(d), since it is increasing in π. Thus, we see that
for every d i , and so the thresholds are lower under the friendship paradox. This means that there is more public goods provision by all degrees of agents under the friendship paradox, but this comes from the reaction to an overall lower expected probability that a random neighbor provides the public good under the friendship paradox.
Note, however, that the expected utility of an agent of any given degree generally tends to go down in the network setting compared to the random matching setting, since agents are matched with agents of higher degrees and expect less activity from their neighbors overall. Thus, even though the network setting incentivizes more activity by agents, this is because they are more frequently matched with high degree agents who tend to free-ride more on the action. This leads to lower expected utilities by each type of agent and overall.
20 In a case in which θ i has an atomless distribution, the indifferent case is negligible and otherwise there may be some mixing at the precise threshold of t i (d i ). Although I have analyzed the case of the best-shot public goods game, it is clear that the reasoning applies to more general games, similarly to the way that the linear-quadratic results generalized in the previous section.
In games of strategic substitutes, endogenizing the network leads to ambiguous effects on overall actions and welfare. In most such settings, people who have higher payoffs from the activity also tend to benefit from having higher degree (presuming that there is some marginal gain from neighbors' provision of the public good on top of one's own provision).
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This leads to an overall ambiguous effect as agents' high type pushes them to take higher actions but their increased endogenous degree tends to reduce their actions -and the overall effect depends on the parametric specification. Thus, while the results from the strategic complements in terms of comparisons on a fixed network have (reversed) analogs in the case of strategic substitutes, the case in which the network is endogenized does not extend. This means that the overall impact of the friendship paradox in the case of strategic substitutes can be ambiguous and will depend on details of the preferences -whether the individual incentives to provide the good or the local externalities dominate.
Concluding Remarks
'Popular' individuals disproportionately impact the perceptions in a society. If popular individuals tended to act the same as others this would not systematically bias peoples' perceptions of norms or the norms themselves. However, there are two ways in which popular individuals and their behaviors differ from others. First, they have more interactions and that leads them to act more extremely with regards to any of the numerous behaviors that involves strategic complementarities. Second, people who are more predisposed to like a certain behavior will also seek to have more interactions involving that behavior.
As shown in this paper, these two distortions both lead to increases in perceptions of behavior and ultimately feed back to increase the overall behavior in a society. Depending on the nature of the externalities of the activity this can be good or bad. For instance, these results help us to understand teens' systematic over-estimation of their peers' delinquencies. This then provides insight into why drug and alcohol problems are pervasive in high school and college environments. It is worth noting that these distortions can be even further amplified by social media, where distortions in the number of frequency of interactions can be even more extreme and in which what is posted or communicated is also quite selective.
Understanding the friendship paradox's role in the formation of social norms has some 22 In the case of the best-shot public goods game, the endogenous network formation game becomes degenerate. Any agent who intends to provide the public good in that game gets no additional value from having neighbors. Thus, the only agents who would choose to pay to have connections would be those planning not to provide the public good -but then they would not want to have connections in that case. To have a nontrivial game in which anyone forms connections, agents have to be endowed with some base degree. In that case, in equilibrium, only the lowest degree agents would provide the public good. Those agents actually turn out to be the higher θ agents in this particular game. direct policy implications as it suggests that providing better information about the overall behavior of a population, and making individuals with more socially beneficial behaviors more prominent, could help undo the amplifications and distortions in the case of destructive or detrimental norms. This also sheds light on the importance of role models and information access in improving norms. Interestingly, the friendship paradox can also be Pareto improving in settings with positive externalities.
Taking expectations of both sides of the above expression for x i (θ i , d i ) with respect to E yields
Thus,
Substituting the above expression into the solution for x i (θ i , d i ) leads to the following characterization of equilibrium (when P i 's are the same for all i),
, as claimed in the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 1: Recalling from (2) that
it follows from Lemma 3 that the equilibrium actions are
The first part of the proposition, that ] follows from the fact that P strictly first order stochastically dominates P and x f p is increasing in d i , which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2: First note that the expected utility from (3) can be rewritten as
Next note that given that E[θ] > 0, it follows that from the equilibrium expressions for actions, that actions x f p and x bench are bounded away from 0 across θ i , d i . Therefore E i j∈N i
x j and E i j =i,j / ∈N i x j are both bounded below, in both the network and benchmark matching cases. Moreover, by Proposition 1, they are strictly higher in the network case. Thus, for any nonnegative φ and positive x i , (6) is strictly higher when evaluated relative to the expectations of network matching than relative to population matching, and then given that x f p is a best response, (6) is at least as high when evaluated relative to x f p and network matching as x bench and network matching, which is strictly higher than x bench and population matching. Given that this is a strict inequality when φ is 0, across all types and degrees in a compact set, and utilities are continuous in φ, this also holds for some negative φ's, establishing the first conclusion of the proposition. Next, note that the equilibrium actions are independent of φ. Fixing any equilibrium pair of functions x f p and x bench -which are both independent of φ -if φ is negative enough then the payoffs become negative as these only multiply E i j∈N i
x j and E i j =i,j / ∈N i x j .
Then given that E i j∈N i
x j and E j =i,j / ∈N i x j are strictly lower in the benchmark case, then there is a phi < 0 after which the utility becomes strictly more negative for all types (noting that Θ is compact and degrees are bounded by n − 1), concluding the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Recall that
This is increasing in a, decreasing in c (under the maintained assumptions that on c > a
).
Note that E[d] is increasing as we take a first order stochastic dominance shift in P , and also as we take a mean preserving spread of P since
. The comparative statics follow directly. The comparisons in utilities follow from a straightforward extension of the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Consider some i and fix the actions of the other agents d j (θ j ). Let us first consider the choice of an agent as if they were maximizing a continuous random variable.
Taking the first order conditions (and invoking the Envelope Theorem) for the maximization of i's expected utility leads to
The second derivative of the expected utility is
From (4) it follows that + ad i E [θ]
c(c − a
) and so it boils down to a comparison between E [θ] and E [θ]. Note that
whenever there are at least two degrees chosen in equilibrium, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6:
The existence and monotonicity of greatest equilibria, in both the network and population matching cases, follows from Proposition 14 in Van Zandt and Vives (2007) . The ordering between actions follows from the fact that P i strictly first order stochastically dominates P i (given that P i has weight on at least two degrees) and Proposition 16 in Van Zandt and Vives (2007), as we can view the only difference between x f p i and x bench i as a change in the distributions over neighbors' degrees. The distribution over other agents' types is unchanged, given the independence, and then to see the first order stochastic dominance, note that P i (d)/P i (d) = d/E[d] which is strictly increasing in d. The strict ordering of actions in the case with a smooth dimension and all interior actions then follows from their Corollary 17.
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23 Note that their proof extends to the case in which the stochastic dominance is strict only on one dimension of agents' types, here degrees, and that dimension drives a strict increase in the derivative of utility with respect to the smooth dimension of actions.
